“Scientists still can’t figure out why X happens.”
It’s a common headline you see in science reporting.
But not all unsolved problems are the same, and it is important to know the differences between them. I can think of three main types.
Type I-a problems: “The needle is too small.”
Type I problems are those that are genuinely difficult to solve. For example, “what is dark matter?”
Specifically, for type I-a problems, they are not yet solved because we don’t have the experimental means to inform the answer or confirm the theory, yet. This may be because the technology isn’t there, or because of how expensive the experimental setup is, e.g. a new particle accelerator or a space telescope. Fundamental physics problems tend to be in this category.
Type I-b problems: “The haystack is too big.”
These are problems that are not necessarily hindered by experimental limitations, but by the sheer volume of search space.
They are similar to type I-a problems — in the sense that both are genuine problems the scientific community is actively trying to solve. But, instead of there being a scarcity of data, there is perhaps too much data to scan through or too many experiments to perform, e.g. the search for a more effective drug for a specific illness, or the search for a better material for a specific use. Problems in materials science, chemistry, biology, medicine, etc. tend to be in this category.
By the way, the line between type I-a and type I-b is fuzzy. The line between all of these are going to be fuzzy. All anthropocentric classification systems are going to be like this.
Type II problems: “We don’t have the needle/haystack (anymore).”
These are the type of problems that will (probably) never be solved because the data is impossible to obtain. For example, what happens inside a black hole or behind the cosmic microwave background?
Many archeological mysteries also fall under this category.
Type III-a problems: “Why is there a needle in this haystack?”
Here we begin getting into what I call pseudo-mysteries, which are the ones that motivated me to write this article — because they are misrepresented as being on equal footing as the “legitimate” mysteries above.
Type III-a problems are question cascades.
Example: Why does spoiled milk smell bad?
Because of fermentation.
Yeah, but why does fermented milk smell bad?
Because of evolution?
Yeah, but why does anything smell bad? Why can we smell at all? What is life? You don’t seem to know the answer after all!
Type III-b problems: “Why are there needles in haystacks?”
Here we begin getting into what I call pseudo-mysteries, which are the ones that motivated me to write this article — because they are misrepresented as being on equal footing as the “legitimate” mysteries above.
Type III-b problems usually involve empirical/theoretical confusion.
Example: Why is ice slippery?
Ice isn’t slippery by itself. It is slippery only to certain things when they come into contact with the ice. It isn’t fair to say “scientists still don’t know why ice is slippery.”
Ok, how about “scientists still don’t know how ice skates slide on ice?”
This is still not fair, because the phenomenon of ice skates sliding on ice is conditional. Scientists do know several mechanisms that cause a skate blade to glide on ice, but, depending on the condition of the ice and the blade, one mechanism may play a larger role than others. It is often not reasonable to ask for a satisfactory theoretical model for a mostly empirical observation. I’ve written about this.
I have grouped type III-a and type III-b problems together because they are both multiple questions posed as a single question. The question cascade for type III-a problems is linear, i.e. a series of why’s. The question cascade for type III-b problems is parallel, where there are often already many “competing” theories that are not really competing in the sense that scientists don’t know which theory is right, but are complementary conditional theories that all play a part in explaining the phenomenon.
Type IV problems: “Anyone want to pay me to find the needle?”
Finally, these are the gee-whiz problems that scientists “still don’t understand” because, frankly, nobody is funding these things. For example, “why do some people have the urge to poop when walking into a book store?”
Note: The types are not exclusive of each other, and a problem can, for example, be both type IV and type I-a.
